Every day we can see big protests in the cities in Georgia against the government. This government is too close to Moscow. The result of the elections was manipulated by the government. The majority of people in Georgia believe in the european way for their country. An analysis by David Dondua.
Georgia may not be considered geographically as Europe, but its people strongly identify themselves as Europeans. This deep-rooted connection goes back in history, first evidenced by the adoption of Christianity as early as the 3rd century. For Georgians, the Christian religion was not just a faith but a way of life that shaped their civilisation. Following the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the rulers of Georgia, cut off from Christendom, always sought ties with Europe.
When Georgia regained independence in 1991, it finally pursued its long-standing European path. This was not a political decision dictated by any single party or government but a value-based choice embraced by the nation. Over the past three and a half decades, every government has worked toward closer ties with the West. The current ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party (1), which came to power in 2012, initially assured the public of its commitment to EU integration. However, this rhetoric masked the reality that, over its 12 years in power, GD systematically steered Georgia toward Russia’s orbit and, by the 26 October 2024 elections, had fully distanced the country from the democratic world.
Nevertheless, public support for EU integration remained overwhelming. According to a March 2024 survey by EU Neighbours East, 81% of respondents expressed support for EU membership (2). Yet, despite an openly anti-Western pivot, GD still managed to secure around 40% of the vote in the 2024 elections, according to independent exit polls (The Central Election Commission reported 53.93% for GD). Even with systemic fraud, 40% is still an unusually high result for a party that has actively obstructed EU integration.
What was the magic?
With a significant decline in public support by 2024, GD sought to win back disillusioned voters—mainly middle-aged and senior citizens—by promoting the following fear-based messages:
„Do you want the United National Movement (UNM) (3) back?!“
„Do you want war?!“
„Do you want gay parades?!“ (4)
For 12 years, GD has relied on relentless criticism and demonisation of the former UNM government and its founder, ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili, as its primary political strategy. The party used Saakashvili’s legacy as a political weapon, making it the central issue in every election, even long after he had left power. The government met any form of public criticism or policy demand with a single response – Do you want the National Movement back? Ironically, Saakashvili’s continuous presence in Georgian media reinforced public fatigue and fuelled resentment. As a result, even those disillusioned with GD were reluctant to support opposition.
The government dragged all opposition parties, critics, and even foreign partners into one basket and labelled them a „collective National Movement.“ The reason was to make the Georgian political landscape binary: GD or UNM. By keeping Saakashvili at the forefront of national discourse, GD effectively prevented the emergence of a third political force, leaving voters with only a black-and-white choice.
Georgian Dream framed the opposition not as political competitors but as enemies of the state. It positioned itself as the sole protector against this supposed threat. Rather than addressing current pressing issues in its election campaign, GD’s only promise was to “save the country from enemy forces.”
The other two messages were explicitly designed for the 2024 elections. In a country that has fought Russia three times in the past 30 years, the fear of war is not surprising. The protracted war in Ukraine has further aggravated these anxieties, making it easy for the government to manipulate this fearful narrative. The government also claimed that the West pressured Georgia to open a second front against Russia and convinced the public that the opposition’s victory would inevitably drag the country into war. Unfortunately, though not intended for this purpose, some Ukrainian politicians‘ statements added fuel to this unfounded fear. (5,6) As a result, GD successfully framed „peace“ as synonymous with appeasement toward Russia. Meanwhile, the opposition failed to convince voters that the fundamental choice was not war versus peace but aligning with Russia versus Europe.
Another fear-based message was designed for conservative voters, playing on cultural and identity anxieties. GD reshaped the discussion on EU integration, arguing that, yes, Georgia’s ancestors always aligned with Europe, but modern Europe no longer shares the same values and traditions. The ruling party’s media machine spread blatant disinformation, echoing Russian propaganda by depicting Europe and the US as centres of moral decay. Some clergy in the Georgian Orthodox Church reinforced this narrative, helping to convince people that European integration threatened Georgia’s cultural identity.
Amidst negative messages, the government promoted one seemingly positive pre-election slogan: “Towards Europe with Dignity!” They assured voters of their commitment to EU membership, but only in a manner that “would not harm” national interests. Many misinformed voters accepted this absurd assurance since Georgia achieved several key milestones in European integration during GD’s time in power—signing the Association Agreement, establishing the DCFTA, securing visa-free travel, obtaining EU candidate status and gaining the prospect of opening accession negotiations.
But right after getting EU candidate country status, the government, instead of preparing for the opening of accession negotiations, began taking undisguised anti-European actions, including adopting controversial laws and violently cracking down peaceful protests. Despite repeated warnings from EU leaders that these actions would threaten the accession process, many voters still trusted the government’s false narrative.
Opposition parties focused primarily on ending GD’s 12-year reign but gave little attention to what would come after the elections. The ruling party capitalised on this as a pretext to accuse the opposition of plotting a coup. Moreover, the four main opposition parties/blocs failed to set aside their rivalries and present a united front. Credit to the opposition, despite their own shortcomings and the government’s extensive use of administrative resources, election rigging, voter pressure, threats and bribery, independent exit polls indicated that opposition parties collectively received more votes than Georgian Dream. (7)
Lessons from the 2024 Elections
Most of the Georgians, including many GD supporters, still remain pro-European. However, this support is more emotional than knowledge-based, which makes citizens highly susceptible to disinformation and manipulation. Russia perfectly exploited this vulnerability through an aggressive information war, but its efforts would not have been that effective without the support of the GD government. Whether GD acted under direct orders from Moscow or just adopted the Kremlin’s well-honed playbook for manipulating public opinion, the result was the same. The party’s pre-election rhetoric mirrored Kremlin propaganda, portraying the West as a hostile force that threatens national, traditional and cultural values. Democracy, freedom of speech and pluralism were equalled to betrayal, while the peaceful protest was framed as near-terrorism. Patriotism became synonymous with party loyalty, leaving no room for genuine debate or dissent.
The elections and post-election protests have revealed a deep societal divide over values—a rift deliberately widened by the Georgian Dream. Today, in Georgia, we witness a clash of generations. The younger generation, which has experienced European reality – has lived in Europe, has studied or has just travelled, is a staunch supporter of the country’s European future. This assertion is confirmed by the fact that the opposition won by a large margin in the polling stations opened in European countries, as was the case with Moldova. Meanwhile, the older generation remains shaped mainly by its post-Soviet past, where the rule of a single party, its billionaire leader, the master-client relationship and corruption feel more familiar than political pluralism and diversity.
This is not only a Georgian problem. The Kremlin is actively trying to manipulate public opinion worldwide. Therefore, EU-aspiring countries must do their utmost to ensure their populations have adequate knowledge of the European Union. Support for the EU aspirations should be knowledge-based and not mere emotion. A well-informed citizen is always more resilient to manipulations. Moldova secured a narrow win in the last elections because, unlike Georgia, its government actively defended state interests. But Moscow will continue and intensify its work there. Armenia faces similar danger. When the active phase of the war in Ukraine stops, the Kremlin will switch to full-scale information warfare.
On its part, the EU should improve its strategic communication efforts and adopt proactive and thorough strategy with country-specific information plans that address the specific vulnerabilities of each EU-aspiring nation. With the adoption by the Georgian Parliament of the so-called „Russian law“, which restricts foreign funding for civil society and NGOs, the EU must develop new, effective mechanisms to support independent voices. However tricky, ways should be found to increase the financing of independent journalism, media literacy initiatives and fact-checking programs. Strengthening cooperation with civil society, educational institutions and digital platforms is vital to fostering critical thinking and resilience against disinformation and manipulation. The Kremlin is now on the winning side in the information war. It is time for the EU to respond assertively, making the battle for truth a priority goal of its foreign policy.
1 Georgian Dream is a political party founded on April 19, 2012, by billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili. It first gained power that same year as part of a coalition and later secured victory in the next three elections independently. The results of the 2024 elections remain highly contested.
3 The United National Movement is a political party founded by former president Mikheil Saakashvili, which governed Georgia unilaterally from 2003 to 2012.
4 Gay parades are referenced broadly, symbolizing a wide range of issues—including the categorical rejection of the LGBTIQA+ community, perceived threats to Georgian traditions and cultural values, family sanctity, as well as insults to Orthodox Christian sacred beliefs.
7 https://jam-news.net/georgia-election-exit-poll-results/
c Foto: Leila Blagonravova
The author, David Dondua, is Chairman of Board, EU Awareness Centre.
